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Since the International Agency on Cancer Research’s monograph found glyphosate to be a likely
carcinogen, the regulatory focus on the chemical has centred on this determinative criterion for
regulatory action. Yet, other pertinent factors, such as the effects of glyphosate on fresh and
ground water and ensuing effects on biodiversity, have received less attention as legitimate
rationales for regulating the chemical. This underrepresentation prevents a wider policy
discussion on the environmental and human health effects of the chemical and fails to disrupt
assumptions of path-dependently continuing on agriculture’s chemical treadmill. To avoid ad hoc
post hoc chemical regulation, we assess four areas of chemical regulatory oversight in Europe
with regard to glyphosate affecting water: (1) the undue emphasis on in laboratorio versus in situ
testing; (2) assessing single chemicals (isolated glyphosate) versus admixtures (glyphosate plus
surfactants and adjuvants) that are used in practice; (3) the tendency to downplay harms to non-
human life; and (4) the lack of policy coherence in the existing regulatory framework. Focusing
on European Union regulation of pesticide and water policy affecting aquatic environments, we
conclude that issues of measurement and priority have become highly politicised in both science
and policy, requiring preventative, precautionary frameworks utilising plural forms of measurement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental risk assessments often overlook the structural and systemic “grounded
social causes of precarity that expose and sensitize people to hazard”.1 A chemical’s
hazard is derived from both its intrinsic properties to interact and affect biological
material in a controlled setting as well as relational harms when that chemical
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interacts with different organisms and chemicals in admixtures rather than in isolation.
Chemical assessments frequently pay more attention to the former rather than latter
hazards, possibly underestimating real-world risks. Virtually all chemical exposures
occur together with other chemicals, with interactions affecting organisms variously
depending on exposure combinations. Especially in different media such as water or
soil, rather than being inert, chemicals degrade or potentiate in as-yet unstudied ways.
Against this background, this article considers how the legal and policy frameworks
for the assessments of glyphosate – the most used herbicide in history – tend to de-
emphasise the assessment of its effects on fresh water. Doing so also entails
interpreting the limits of current legal frameworks in the European Union (EU) to
address the risks of freshwater contaminations by pesticides. This paper claims that
the EU regulatory system currently does not adequately protect aquatic ecosystems
from pesticide contamination, substantiated through analysing the case of glyphosate.
Agrochemical runoff damage to freshwater systems has been identified as a major
threat to wildlife, ecosystems and securing clean drinking water for populations
in European countries2 and globally.3 Widespread use of fertilisers, pesticides
and herbicides in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is documented in the
corresponding chemical signatures found in aquatic environments globally.4 Until
stronger environmental regulations began being implemented in the 1960s and 1970s,
post-war chemical effluent was regularly dumped without reflection or legal restric-
tion, often harming riparian life and sometimes contaminating ground water.5 While
during this early period of environmental regulation the USA led international policy
diffusion on freshwater protections,6 by the 1990s Europe had taken the regulatory
lead, and it is currently perceived to be at the forefront of water protection, both in
terms of regulations and enforcement.7 Europe’s embrace of integrated chemical
management and policy has allowed for increased environmental health, and through
its relation, human health.8 Nevertheless, European water quality is in bad shape:
together with near-ubiquitous crop over-fertilisation and loss of habitat due to
2 MA Beketov et al, “Pesticides Reduce Regional Biodiversity of Stream Invertebrates” (2013) 110 Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences 11039; M Liess and PC Von Der Ohe, “Analyzing Effects of Pesticides on
Invertebrate Communities in Streams” (2005) 24 Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 954.
3 WA Battaglin et al, “Glyphosate and Its Degradation Product AMPA Occur Frequently and Widely in U.S. Soils,
Surface Water, Groundwater, and Precipitation” (2014) 50 Journal of the American Water Resources Association 275;
C Revenga andWorld Resources Institute (eds), Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems: Freshwater Systems (Washington,
DC, World Resources Institute 2000).
4 CHVane et al, “Chemical Signatures of the Anthropocene in the Clyde Estuary, UK: Sediment-Hosted Pb, 207/206Pb,
Total PetroleumHydrocarbon, Polyaromatic Hydrocarbon and Polychlorinated Biphenyl Pollution Records” (2011) 369
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 1085.
5 IM Sayre, “International Standards for Drinking Water” (1988) 80 Journal – American Water Works Association 53.
6 D Kelemen and D Vogel, “Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union in International
Environmental Politics” (2010) 43 Comparative Political Studies 427.
7 S Vaughan, EU Chemicals Regulation: New Governance, Hybridity and REACH (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar
Publishing 2015); SF Hansen, L Carlsen and JA Tickner, “Chemicals Regulation and Precaution: Does REACH
Really Incorporate the Precautionary Principle” (2007) 10 Environmental Science & Policy 395.
8 Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM), Strategic Approach to International
Chemicals Management: Comprising the Dubai Declaration on International Chemicals Management, the
Overarching Policy Strategy and the Global Plan Action: Resolution of the International Conference on Chemicals
Management (Nairobi, United Nations Environment Programme 2006).
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morphological changes, agrochemical inputs are degrading freshwater quality throughout
Europe, by some accounts reducing ecosystem functions by over 20%.9 Thus, one would
expect that glyphosate regulation, in addition to attending to important issues raised
regarding direct human health questions, would take into serious consideration how it
affects water quality.
Based on the central role for health that water plays, such regulation would draw on the
assumed extensive research analysing the risks of glyphosate in impacting the health of
aquatic ecosystems. Yet compared to other scientific domains scrutinizing this chemical,
there are surprisingly few field studies on glyphosate’s effects in and on fresh water. Most
existing research in this area seems to not account for the adjuvants in commercial
glyphosate admixtures, such as RoundUp®, leaving out crucial consequences of how
chemical mixtures affect various domains. In examining how European law assesses
chemical risk in surface water and ground water, this article emphasises the politics
and consequences of measuring the ecotoxicity of chemicals like glyphosate in
isolation rather than according to their interactions. Focusing on the impact of
glyphosate on aquatic ecosystems and the policies around chemicals in water both in
the special case of glyphosate and more generally, we hypothesise that the legal and
scientific assessment processes are fraught with blind spots. While clearly we cannot
look at all of the gaps here, we point out some of the blind spots specifically in
chemical regulation (using glyphosate as a model case) in the EU pertaining to effects
and interactions with fresh water.10
This contribution assesses the discursive and regulatory context surrounding the
measurement and assessment of glyphosate’s impacts on aquatic environments, rather
than exhaustively weighing the biodiversity impact of glyphosate and its co-
constituent chemicals on aquatic life from a natural science perspective. It is
structured as follows: in Section II, we start by presenting some data on glyphosate
contamination in surface water and ground water; we then offer an overview of the
debate that has ensued among scientists and technical regulatory bodies vis-à-vis the
methodologies used to assess the effects of glyphosate in aquatic ecosystems. In this
context, it has been argued that taking a single-metric approach to detection may
predictably pass over other chemical combinations occurring in water (ie from
adjuvants, as well as through degradation and reactions with other present chemicals),
which is related to the fact that relevant guidance documents in the ecotoxicological
9 M-S Javier et al, Water Pollution from Agriculture: A Global Review. Executive Summary (FAO Colombo,
Sri Lanka, International Water Management Institute (IWMI) CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and
Ecosystems (WLE) 2017); K Peters, M Bundschuh and RB Schäfer, “Review on the Effects of Toxicants on
Freshwater Ecosystem Functions” (2013) 180 Environmental Pollution 324; PC von der Ohe et al, “Water Quality
Indices across Europe – A Comparison of the Good Ecological Status of Five River Basins” (2007) 9 Journal of
Environmental Monitoring 970; C Stoate et al, “Ecological Impacts of Arable Intensification in Europe” (2001) 63
Journal of Environmental Management 337.
10 SO Funtowicz and JR Ravetz, “Three Types of Risk Assessment and the Emergence of Post-Normal Science” in
S Krimsky and D Golding (eds), Social Theories of Risk (Westport, CT, Praeger 1992) pp 251–74; S Jasanoff, “Science,
Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA” (1992) 7 Osiris 194; S Jasanoff, “Technologies of Humility: Citizen
Participation in Governing Science” in A Bogner and H Torgersen (eds), Wozu Experten? (VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften 2005) <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-322-80692-5_17> (last accessed 1 June 2020).
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risk assessment process leave ample room for interpretation.11 The dominance of this
single-metric approach is so powerful that its narrow scope has become system-
defining and entrenched in the scientific, political and legal formats, rendering effects
not fitting this model largely illegible to these domains of enquiry.12
In Section III, we show how environmental protections of aquatic environments are
present in European law, but often receive superficial or secondary attention in
practice. We argue that this is because in the EU legal system, important issues such
as schemes for reducing pesticide quantities are neglected. Overall, we find that
regulatory policy structurally deprioritises water legislation and water politics vis-à-
vis other political and economic issues. This systematic ambiguity regarding the
protection of aquatic ecosystem health in legal and political discourse has been
documented as subsumed under heading of “anthropocentrism” in the chemical
Anthropocene.13
Finally, in Section IV, we reflect on the discrepancies between the regulations
for aquatic contamination and the implementation of these policies in practice.
Ecotoxicological assessments emphasise the importance of ensuring that no
unacceptable harms come from chemical application, and yet the actual discrepancies
between which outcomes are in fact deemed acceptable rarely gets fed back into the
policy process.14 We further discuss how the current deficient legal framework is
situated in a broader socioeconomic system and can be understood as part and parcel
of this system. While enforcement questions bear on the regulatory systems involved,
analysing enforcement is outside the scope of this paper. When analysing these
discrepancies, we also draw on prior theoretical insights from the literatures of
science and technology studies and politics of science advice.15
In addressing these questions through the case of glyphosate and its associated
products, we enquire into how “compartmentalising” risk serves to underestimate the
transversal actual hazards that chemicals catalyse in waterways for humans and other
organisms. Compartmentalisation occurs both in the separation of risk assessment and
11 CRobinson et al, “Achieving a High Level of Protection from Pesticides in Europe: Problems with the Current Risk
Assessment Procedure and Solutions” (2020) European Journal of Risk Regulation DOI: 10.1017/err.2020.18;
R Altenburger et al, “Future Water Quality Monitoring – Adapting Tools to Deal with Mixtures of Pollutants in
Water Resource Management” (2015) 512–13 Science of the Total Environment 540; R Altenburger et al, “Future
Water Quality Monitoring: Improving the Balance between Exposure and Toxicity Assessments of Real-World
Pollutant Mixtures” (2019) 31 Environmental Sciences Europe 12; L Posthuma et al, “Mixtures of Chemicals Are
Important Drivers of Impacts on Ecological Status in European Surface Waters” (2019) 31 Environmental Sciences
Europe 71.
12 D Demortain, “Expertise, Regulatory Science and the Evaluation of Technology and Risk: Introduction to the
Special Issue” (2017) 55 Minerva 139.; A Arcuri and YH Hendlin, “The Chemical Anthropocene: Glyphosate as a
Case Study of Pesticide Exposures” (2019) 30 King’s Law Journal 234; JC Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press 1999); G
Markowitz and D Rosner, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution (Berkeley, University of
California Press 2002).
13 Arcuri and Hendlin, supra, note 12.
14 US Environmental Protection Agency, “Summary of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act”
(US EPA, 22 February 2013) <https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-federal-insecticide-fungicide-and-
rodenticide-act> (last accessed 8 March 2020). The manufacturer must show that a pesticide “will not generally
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment”.
15 Jasanoff, “Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA”, supra, note 10; Jasanoff, “Technologies of
Humility”, supra, note 10; Funtowicz and Ravetz, supra, note 10.
542 European Journal of Risk Regulation Vol. 11:3
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management and in the separation of the active substance glyphosate from real-world
blended chemicals. Here, we focus on the authorisation of the active substance on the
European level and, to a lesser extent, on the authorisation of plant protection
products (PPPs) at the EU Member State level – rather than on other aspects of
pesticide politics, such as retail or application. Pesticide politics is complex. But the
two-fold EU authorisation process is particularly complex and has been demonstrated
as being determinative in making sense of other aspects of chemical regulation.16
In this contribution, we specifically focus on the various reductionist modes of
pesticide risk assessment that justify downstream authorisation. The compartmentalisation
of risk assessments based primarily on in laboratorio data on a given isolated chemical
versus the complicated relation of these to messy in situ field and epidemiological
data leads to the perverse valuation of models of chemical toxicity over the actual
effects that these chemicals have in interaction with other chemicals, other substrates
such as water and the varying experiences of biological life. In situ (higher-tier)
experiments, however, produce higher ranges of uncertainty regarding the absence of
harm – even harms that are actually present. Paradoxically, by trying to make
regulatory tests of chemicals more representative of reality, risk assessment tends
towards permissiveness in terms of authorising harmful chemicals.
To reach these conclusions, we drew on document analysis, desk research and a non-
systematic literature search (including, for instance, a web search for position statements
on glyphosate and water by regulatory agencies at the EU level and in selected Member
States – all major position statements and opinion pieces that contain mention of
glyphosate and biodiversity). This article does not pretend to be a granular critique of
the technicalities of the risk assessment procedure (ie comparing contrastive guidance
documents), nor does it propose a cohesive plan to refashion chemical regulatory
processes with respect to water. Instead, our findings offer key avenues for further
research, pointing out for political scientists and legal scholars areas for investigating
weaknesses at the intersection of pesticides and water regulation.
II. THE PRESENCE OF GLYPHOSATE IN WATER AND ITS IMPACT ON ECOSYSTEMS
Narratives of how – even whether – pesticides impact (aquatic) ecosystems seem to be
neatly aligned with different positions on the role of industrial agriculture.17 This section
explores the risks of glyphosate for aquatic ecosystems – chemical impacts on ecosystem
functionality or biodiversity – highlighting specific controversies as debated in
environmental science and policy.
16 D Demortain, “Expertise, Regulatory Science and the Evaluation of Technology and Risk: Introduction to the
Special Issue” (2017) 55 Minerva 139.
17 H Muilerman, “Industry Writing Its Own Rules” (Pesticide Action Network Europe, 6 February 2018) <https://
www.pan-europe.info/press-releases/2018/02/industry-writing-its-own-rules> (last accessed 5 May 2020); E Bozzini,
“Open Controversies: Bees’Health, Glyphosate and EndocrineDisruption” in EBozzini, Pesticide Policy and Politics in
the European Union (Cham, Springer International Publishing 2017) <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-
52736-9_4> (last accessed 6 March 2020); JR Rohr, “Atrazine and Amphibians: A Story of Profits, Controversy,
and Animus”, Encyclopedia of the Anthropocene (Amsterdam, Elsevier 2018) <https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/
retrieve/pii/B9780128096659098852> (last accessed 3 March 2020).
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Pesticides like herbicides (herbicides are here considered a subset of pesticides)
applied to crops impact soil, agricultural irrigation channels and runoff.18 Runoff from
these applications has different impacts on varying types of aquatic environments, such
as ground water, rivers, wetlands and reservoirs. Both direct and indirect runoff can
affect water in proportion to the amount of chemicals applied, how focused they are
sprayed on plants, the adhesives or adjuvants in the chemical and the size and
ecological structure of the water system.
Europe is an outlier globally in terms of peak concentrations for glyphosate in
waterbodies. In Europe, there are persistent but low concentrations of glyphosate. In
many other global regions, peak concentrations sometimes reach up to 10,000 times the
concentration of average EU levels.19 While ecotoxicologists in Europe acknowledge
that glyphosate exacerbates and compounds multiple environmental stressors and water
quality issues,20 they simultaneously fear that likely alternative replacement chemicals,
which would make their way through prevailing chemical regulation frameworks, could
be even more environmentally harmful – if agricultural production continues unchanged.21
This suggests that plans to make EU glyphosate-free must also be accompanied by the larger
challenge of reducing chemical inputs in agriculture in general; and that failing to address
these issues in tandem may land regulators in the same tight spot they find themselves in
with glyphosate, only next time with glyphosate’s successor.22
Various statutes and laws in national and EU legislation protect water from chemical
runoff, all of which have fundamental strengths and flaws. The central piece of legislation
on water quality, with an ambitious schedule and a reporting system that has re-orientated
watermanagement approaches throughout Europe, is the EUWater FrameworkDirective
(WFD). Its twin objectives stipulate that European waterbodies should be in good
chemical and ecological condition. Pesticides (including herbicides such as glyphosate)
can be found to violate these objectives in waterbodies either by exceeding environ-
mental quality standards (EQSs; chemical status) or by significantly impacting the ecology
of awaterbody (ecological status). Notably, glyphosate is not among the substances of the EU
WFD’s daughter directive on EQSs for surface waters 2008/105/EC, which sets limits and
monitoring obligations for around forty-five specifically hazardous chemical substances (not
only pesticides). As it is formally a EU directive that specifies certain substances rather than
others, the decision-making process is highly political: if a Member State fails to limit only
18 S Stehle and R Schulz, “Pesticide Authorization in the EU – Environment Unprotected?” (2015) 22 Environmental
Science and Pollution Research 19632.
19 Battaglin et al, supra, note 3.
20 A Szekacs and BDarvas, “Forty Years with Glyphosate” inMNHasaneen (ed.),Herbicides –Properties, Synthesis
andControl ofWeeds (London, InTech 2012)<http://www.intechopen.com/books/herbicides-properties-synthesis-and-
control-of-weeds/forty-years-with-glyphosate> (last accessed 11 March 2020); M Sihtmäe et al, “Ecotoxicological
Effects of Different Glyphosate Formulations” (2013) 72 Applied Soil Ecology 215.
21 SODuke and SB Powles, “Glyphosate: AOnce-in-a-Century Herbicide” (2008) 64 PestManagement Science 319;
JPMyers et al, “Concerns over Use of Glyphosate-Based Herbicides and Risks Associated with Exposures: AConsensus
Statement” (2016) 15 Environmental Health: A Global Access Science Source 19; Bayer, “Glyphosate’s Role in
Preserving the Environment and Biodiversity” (Bayer Global, 10 March 2020) <https://www.bayer.com/en/
glyphosate-environment-biodiversity.aspx> (last accessed 26 June 2020).
22 J Allen, “Stop Playing Whack-a-Mole with Hazardous Chemicals” (Washington Post, 15 December 2016)
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/stop-playing-whack-a-mole-with-hazardous-chemicals/2016/12/15/
9a357090-bb36-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story.html> (last accessed 16 December 2019).
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one of forty-five substances, then the whole regulation of the chemical status is regarded as
failed for a specific monitoring period. In other words, to regulate a substance through this
directive requires a high degree of consensus on the chemical’s danger to reach the threshold
of regulation. Likewise, the directive is predominantly formulated to apply to large
waterbodies and the chemicals found therein, which means that smaller streams common
in agricultural landscapes are often excluded from river basin management plans. Despite
the lack of systematic monitoring of glyphosate residues in water, evidence has emerged
as to its presence in Europe. In its Report on Glyphosate, the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) acknowledges that glyphosate and its metabolite aminomethyl-
phosphonic acid (AMPA; which maintains the same properties of glyphosate but is more
persistent) have been found in a number of countries above the parametric limits. Italy is
a case in point, where a study by the Italian Higher Institute for Environmental Protec-
tion and Research (ISPRA) in the “National Report of Pesticides in Water” found that
“[i]n surface waters, 274 points of monitoring (21.3% of the total) show glyphosate
concentrations above the limits imposed to guarantee environmental quality standards”.23
Similar to the political debate around glyphosate,24 aspects of the scholarly debate
within ecotoxicology have been extraordinarily heated regarding the extent to which
glyphosate-containing products harm aquatic ecosystems.25 In an unusually hostile
academic exchange in the journal Ecological Applications, two groups of authors
have accused each other of unscientific behaviour – claiming that Roundup® is either
generally harmful or generally safe for amphibians. Contributors to this and sub-
sequent debates have sought to disqualify the other’s research by pointing out the role
of corporate or non-governmental organisation (NGO) funding influencing the
neutrality of their assessments.26 At the centre of the controversy were claims
23 P Paris et al, “Rapporto Nazionale dei Pesticidi Nelle Acque” (ISPRA, April 2018)<http://www.isprambiente.gov.
it/en/publications/reports/national-report-on-pesticides-in-water-2013-2015-2016-data> (last accessed 28 June 2020).
24 J Tosun, H Lelieveldt and TS Wing, “A Case of ‘Muddling Through’? The Politics of Renewing Glyphosate
Authorization in the European Union” (2019) 11 Sustainability 440.
25 RA Relyea, “The Impact of Insecticides and Herbicides on the Biodiversity and Productivity of Aquatic
Communities: Response” (2006) 16 Ecological Applications 2027; RA Relyea, “Amphibians Are Not Ready for
Roundup®” in JE Elliott, CA Bishop and CA Morrissey (eds), Wildlife Ecotoxicology: Forensic Approaches
(Berlin, Springer 2011) pp 267–300; DG Thompson et al, “The Impact of Insecticides and Herbicides on the
Biodiversity and Productivity of Aquatic Communities” (2006) 16 Ecological Applications 2022; JP Giesy,
S Dobson and KR Solomon, “Ecotoxicological Risk Assessment for Roundup® Herbicide” in GW Ware (ed.),
Reviews of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology: Continuation of Residue Reviews (Berlin, Springer 2000)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1156-3_2> (last accessed 3 March 2020).
26 Research has shown the existence of a funding effect. See S Krimsky, “Do Financial Conflicts of Interest Bias
Research? An Inquiry into the “Funding Effect” Hypothesis” (2013) 38(4) Science, Technology & Human Values
566. In this context, it is worth mentioning the questionable symmetry that corporate-funded researchers assume between
their private profit-seeking corporate funding versus researchers funded by NGOs with missions to protect public health
and the environment. This parallel assumes comparable goal-directedness. Yet, should an industry-funded researcher be
influenced by their funding source, the tendency would be to underreport the actual harms of a substance, leading to
potentially substantial health harms; should an environmental or health NGO-funded researcher be influenced by their
funding source, their tendency would be to err on the side of precaution, creating a buffer between possible public health
and environmental harms. For the latter, over-precaution would hurt the profits of a given private corporation and hinder
farmers locked into industrial agriculture, but would favour reduction of material, physical and distributed harms over a
larger group of stakeholders (often with consequent health harms skewing towards impacting those most economically
and otherwise discriminated against in a given society). From a normative perspective, some funding effects may be less
desirable than others. The above does not account for other forms of asymmetry, including the vastly unequal amount of
industry funding aimed at proving the salience and safety of their products, which is orders of magnitude larger than
NGO and state research funding investigating the safety of chemicals.
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regarding Roundup®, the top-selling herbicide product containing glyphosate as its
active compound, as well as the surfactant polyoxyethyleneamine (POEA) and its
impact on lethality to tadpoles (with the claim being: “Amphibians Are Not Ready
for Roundup®”).27 Here, the discussion has focused on the so-called “inert”
ingredients/additives that are part of commercial formulations of herbicides. To
penetrate leaves and to stick to them rather than washing off, Monsanto (now Bayer)
has insisted on the need for such additives.28 Inert ingredients are typically trade
secrets, and the academic discussion has focused on the core issue that the products
used outside the laboratory and in the field are a combination of a highly scrutinised
substance (glyphosate) and under-regulated additives that makes the product highly
toxic to amphibians (eg which penetrate through tadpole gill cells). Critics see a
pattern in the risk assessment systematically underestimating the harm of adjuvants.29
Similar intra-scientific controversies have occurred related to a different herbicide,
atrazine, where a similar drama unfolded with accusations of corporate sponsoring of
“industrial product defence research” and eco-activist research.30 While the glyphosate
and atrazine cases may be the most notable discussions in the literature, in mainstream
ecotoxicology building on field studies, it is increasingly clear that there are negative
effects on aquatic biodiversity or freshwater ecosystem functions from pesticides more
generally.31
A non-systematic search demonstrates the range of ecological effects for which
glyphosate has been implicated in the toxicology literature. Glyphosate’s direct toxic
effects have been described as lethal32 to affected organisms such as amphibians or
pollywogs, or sub-lethal33 but leading to dysergistic (negative synergy) impairment to
affected organisms such as honeybees, spiders and lacewings.34 As described by the
German Federal Agency for Nature Protection (BfN) in their remarkable position
paper on glyphosate,35 the two main ways glyphosate can impact biodiversity are
27 Relyea, “Amphibians Are Not Ready for Roundup®”, supra, note 25.
28 R Mesnage, C Benbrook and MN Antoniou, “Insight into the Confusion over Surfactant Co-Formulants in
Glyphosate-Based Herbicides” (2019) 128 Food and Chemical Toxicology 137; DE Riechers et al, “Surfactant
Effects on Glyphosate Efficacy” (1995) 9 Weed Technology 281.
29 Robinson et al, supra, note 11.
30 Rohr, supra, note 17; MD Boone et al, “Pesticide Regulation amid the Influence of Industry” (2014) 64
BioScience 917.
31 RB Schäfer, “Responses of Freshwater Macroinvertebrates to Pesticides: Insights from Field Studies” (2019) 11
Current Opinion in Environmental Science &Health 1; Peters et al, supra, note 9; RB Schäfer et al, “Effects of Pesticides
on Community Structure and Ecosystem Functions in Agricultural Streams of Three Biogeographical Regions in
Europe” (2007) 382 The Science of the Total Environment 272; E Malaj et al, “Organic Chemicals Jeopardize the
Health of Freshwater Ecosystems on the Continental Scale” (2014) 111 Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 9549; Liess and Ohe, supra, note 2; Beketov et al, supra, note 2.
32 J Plötner and JMatschke, “Acute and Sublethal Toxicity and Indirect Effects of Glyphosate and Its Formulations on
Amphibians –AReview” (2012) 19 Zeitschrift Feldherpetologie 10; Relyea, “The Impact of Insecticides and Herbicides
on the Biodiversity and Productivity of Aquatic Communities: Response”, supra, note 25; Bundesanstalt für
Naturschutz, “Auswirkungen von Glyphosat auf die Biodiversität” 13.
33 MS Balbuena et al, “Effects of Sublethal Doses of Glyphosate on Honeybee Navigation” (2015) 218 Journal of
Experimental Biology 2799; MA Benamú, MI Schneider and NE Sánchez, “Effects of the Herbicide Glyphosate on
Biological Attributes of Alpaida veniliae (Araneae, Araneidae), in Laboratory” (2010) 78 Chemosphere 871; MI
Schneider et al, “Impact of Glyphosate on the Development, Fertility and Demography of Chrysoperla externa
(Neuroptera: Chrysopidae): Ecological Approach” (2009) 76 Chemosphere 1451.
34 Bundesanstalt für Naturschutz, supra, note 32.
35 ibid.
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through: (1) direct toxic effects on non-target organisms; or (2) indirect effects on non-
target organisms. Direct toxic effects on non-target organisms are further subdivided into
lethal and sub-lethal effects. Because of its chemical structure, from a purely theoretical
analysis, it is widely assumed – correctly or not – that there are no direct effects of
glyphosate on insects. Most biologists indicate that glyphosate’s principal effects on
insects result from harms to food webs that negatively impact the agricultural
landscape and organisms. Thus, the German environmental ministry claims: “The use
of broad spectrum herbicides such as glyphosate does not kill insects directly”.36 The
tricky part, however, is that the complicated indirect effects (as well as a range of
conceptions of what counts as an indirect effect) actually do end up harming a variety
of insects.37 The complexity of these effects is exploited by various actors to give
vastly contrastive interpretations about the scale of the problem and the chemical’s
safety. The impact of glyphosate in water includes indirect harms to the insects and
other lifeforms that inhabit it.
Themost influential EU agency in this sphere is EFSA, which advises the Commission
and has been at the centre of European glyphosate regulation through its risk
assessment.38 EFSA notes that glyphosate acts as a broad-spectrum herbicide against
all plants that are not protected by a specific genetic modification. The active
ingredient stops the synthesis of certain amino acids that are essential for plant
growth, leading to plant death. As an individual substance, glyphosate has a relatively
low (eg chronic) toxicity compared to the worst agrochemicals historically – such as
DDT – and appears much less immediately toxic; here, most ecotoxicologists and
regulatory agencies agree.
Yet, as debated as the dysergistic toxicity of glyphosate plus its adjuvants has been for
EFSA, less recognised or accounted for in toxicity regulation has been glyphosate’s
indirect effects on aquatic ecosystems. Because of the complexities of chemically
dependent agricultural production systems and land use configurations impacting
biodiversity, these often delayed or indirect processes have received less focus in
chemical regulation. Agrochemical use is linked to reduced biodiversity through
cascading ecosystem effects involving freshwater contamination, even if biodiversity
loss may not be directly caused by it.39 “Indirect effects” are usually described as the
deterioration of plant and microbial life in agricultural landscapes; these effects are
especially demonstrable on food webs. The influential 2019 Leopoldina report
describes how, at the community level, herbicides doing damage to plants will have
indirect food chain effects (glyphosate was explicitly named), and that these
36 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit, “Was Ist Der Zusammenhang Zwischen
Glyphosat und Insektensterben? | FAQ | BMU” <https://www.bmu.de/faq/was-ist-der-zusammenhang-zwischen-
glyphosat-und-insektensterben/> (last accessed 13 March 2020).
37 Eg, EVSMotta, K Raymann and NAMoran, “Glyphosate Perturbs the Gut Microbiota of Honey Bees” (2018) 115
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 10305.
38 European Food Safety Authority, EFSA Explains Risk Assessment: Glyphosate (Parma, EFSA 2015) <http://
bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:TM0415780:EN:HTML> (last accessed 12 March 2020).
39 Battaglin et al, supra, note 3; MS Vera et al, “New Evidences of Roundup® (Glyphosate Formulation) Impact on
the Periphyton Community and the Water Quality of Freshwater Ecosystems” (2010) 19 Ecotoxicology 710; OK
Borggaard and AL Gimsing, “Fate of Glyphosate in Soil and the Possibility of Leaching to Ground and Surface
Waters: A Review” (2008) 64 Pest Management Science 441.
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processes have not been adequately accounted for in regulatory approval procedures
(which focus on individual populations instead).40 Yet different disciplines and even
different schools of thought within ecology disagree over the implications of
“indirect” ecological effects. We designate “indirect effects” here to encompass the
notion of indirect toxicological and ecological effects that can result from dysergistic
amplification through other effluents and exposures stemming from industrialised
agricultural production. Concretely, glyphosate enables and furthers the usage of vast
monocultural landscapes (and hence, inter alia, limits crop rotation and locks in
specific economics activities and food supply and land use arrangements). These
indirect effects from use on production processes have knock-on effects that
potentiate the actual direct biochemical risks of glyphosate and its adjuvants. As the
most used herbicide worldwide (total historical use globally until 2016 amounts to
6.1 billion kilograms),41 whatever glyphosate’s determined indirect effects, by virtue
of the volume of use, these indirect effects will likely be more pronounced and
varied. The paradox that glyphosate is relatively inexpensive and putatively efficacious
for crop protection in the dominant high-input agrichemical industrial food production
model may render regulators reluctant to directly confront the other costs of the chemical,
such as the ecological ones.42
Worldwide, glyphosate enables genetically modified (GM) plants to be bred to be
glyphosate-resistant. In Europe, glyphosate is authorised for specific uses (in the
context of GM crops being generally prohibited). In the case of Germany, for
example, it is used mostly for stubble management (with uses such as siccation – the
pre-harvest application of pesticides to quicken the crop-drying process – increasingly
being outlawed), while in select countries glyphosate is also approved for aquatic or
semi-aquatic use. Broad agreement among the regulators involved in the two
authorisation procedures at the European and national levels exists that glyphosate
and glyphosate-based products themselves do not constitute major problems for
biodiversity in Europe according to the metrics of the prevailing risk assessment system.
The seeming consensus on the lack of direct biodiversity problems of glyphosate is
surprising, as for some pesticides, such as neonicotinoids, achieving scientific
consensus regarding clearly demonstrated biodiversity impacts has been swift and
effective for establishing the case for regulatory action.43 Yet for glyphosate,
scientists and policymakers by and large have agreed that, for the purposes of the
European authorisation processes, glyphosate should not be outlawed for ecological
reasons. It should be noted, however, that the risk assessment system unnecessarily
confines itself to single-substance analysis only, as discussed below. Agencies such
as Germany’s BfN, for example, which are not directly involved in the authorisation
40 A Schäffer et al, Der Stumme Frühling: Zur Notwendigkeit Eines Umweltverträglichen Pflanzenschutzes (Halle,
Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina eV – Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften 2018).
41 See CM Benbrook, “Trends in Glyphosate Herbicide Use in the United States and Globally” (2016) 28(1)
Environmental Sciences Europe 3.
42 Duke and Powles, supra, note 21.
43 BAWoodcock et al, “Impacts of Neonicotinoid Use on Long-Term Population Changes in Wild Bees in England”
(2016) 7 Nature Communications 12459; M Rundlöf et al, “Seed Coating with a Neonicotinoid Insecticide Negatively
Affects Wild Bees” (2015) 521 Nature 77; SC Kessler et al, “Bees Prefer Foods Containing Neonicotinoid Pesticides”
(2015) 521 Nature 74.
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system or risk assessment, have been much more critical of the biodiversity effects of
glyphosate than the responsible regulatory agencies involved in the two-tier authorisation
system, claiming that “the current state of science indicates that indirect effects of
glyphosate or glyphosate-containing herbicides on non-target species in particular pose a
high risk to biodiversity”.44 Such statements contrast with industry assessments that argue
that a ban on glyphosate is associated with increased environmental pressures from
agriculture due to compensating by deploying more intensive agribusiness practices
requiring higher volumes of potentially more toxic chemicals, leading to worse
biodiversity outcomes.45
Such outsider opinions to established regulatory systems circumvent entrenched risk
assessment paradigms and criticise regulatory agencies for regulating only individual
chemicals in isolation rather than the admixtures used in practice.46 Likewise, cocktail
effects and multiple stressors are at the same time observed as being understudied47
and are thought to be under-regulated, as certain substances are potentiated by others
(eg atrazine and glyphosate amplifying each other’s toxicological affects).48 One
study looking at how sunlight can potentiate the toxicity of certain pesticides
assaying cell micronuclei found pesticides, including glyphosate, to be twenty-fold
more toxic when mixed, and the mixture became 100 times more toxic after light
irradiation due to oxidative stress.49 Prevailing environmental risk assessment
methods are widely acknowledged to be deficient for accurately measuring the
unintended cocktail effects of pesticides.50 It is no simple matter, however, to resolve
this issue: complications regarding risk assessments of pesticides are controversial
and receive a high level of scrutiny.51
In addition to the discrepancy of regulatory assessments focusing on single isolated
chemicals and the cocktail mixtures of chemicals actually applied in situ are the
problems of so-called “higher tiered” risk assessments. Higher-tiered issues coalesce
around the deficiency of pesticide risk assessments based on models of predicted
exposure concentration (PEC) in the environment as required within legal bounds of
certain concentrations in order to be designated safe for non-target organisms in EU
as well as US risk assessment. In this system, the regulatory acceptable concentration
(RAC) is the cornerstone of the risk assessment process. This threshold has been
44 Bundesanstalt für Naturschutz, supra, note 32.
45 Bayer, supra, note 21.
46 W Wagner, “Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data Gap” (2008) 83 Indiana Law
Journal 631.
47 Beketov et al, supra, note 2, “Ecosystem effects of chronic low-level exposures to pesticide mixtures are uncertain”.
48 Vera et al, supra, note 39; A Roustan et al, “Genotoxicity of Mixtures of Glyphosate and Atrazine and Their
Environmental Transformation Products before and after Photoactivation” (2014) 108 Chemosphere 93.
49 Roustan, supra, note 48.
50 KC dos Santos and CBRMartinez, “Genotoxic and Biochemical Effects of Atrazine and Roundup®, Alone and in
Combination, on the Asian Clam Corbicula Fluminea” (2014) 100 Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety 7; Y Kim
et al, “Mixtures of Glyphosate and Surfactant TN20 Accelerate Cell Death via Mitochondrial Damage-Induced
Apoptosis and Necrosis” (2013) 27 Toxicology In Vitro 191; C Heu et al, “A Step Further toward Glyphosate-
Induced Epidermal Cell Death: Involvement of Mitochondrial and Oxidative Mechanisms” (2012) 34
Environmental Toxicology and Pharmacology 144.
51 CADamalas and IG Eleftherohorinos, “Pesticide Exposure, Safety Issues, and Risk Assessment Indicators” (2011)
8 International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 1402.
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problematised as a “controlled experimental tiered risk assessment approach, giving
results that are difficult to extrapolate to a real-world situation”.52 Reliance on
ecotoxicity data from “laboratory and semifield (so-called mesocosm) studies”53 alone
is particularly problematic, as safety concentrations are established through “[s]tandard
toxicity tests, i.e., tests performed with single chemicals and single species under
laboratory conditions without additional stressors”.54 A Pesticides Action Network (PAN)
report notes the following: “Microcosm and mesocosm systems are widely used in
pesticide approvals; their attractiveness can easily be explained because the standards for
aquatic toxicity can be made less strict [emphasis added] in numerous ways compared to
the lower tier studies. This is partly due to the system itself (clean water, no pollution,
variety of organisms) and statistical methods applied but also because uncertainty factors
are lowered or not used anymore in higher tier”.55
Such toxicity analyses are a far cry from the other threshold, which operationalises
“[s]afety factors (also called assessment factors) that account for uncertainties in the
extrapolation to real ecosystems”.56 This evident mismatch between results from field
studies57 (showing that the “relationship between pesticide exposure and community
composition is causal”) and experimental tests relevant for regulation excludes the
key ingredient for regulations: actual outcomes rather than theoretical safety. Apart
from underspecified protection goals, Schäffer et al argue that there is no “scientifically
validated prediction framework” that combines “ecological context, landscape context,
farmer behaviour” and other non-laboratory aspects needed to predict exposure and
effects.58 Instead, provisional authorisation solutions have been proposed (similar to
suggestions to include post-monitoring of pesticide vigilance as guiding principles).
The relative problems with the tiered risk assessment system are less significant for
unambiguously toxic pesticides where predicted exposure exceeds “safe concentrations”,
but they are greater for pesticides where the gap between predicted and actual exposure
widens. Agrochemicals that are less predictable in terms of their field toxicity can
nonetheless be authorised “if the producer can show through further data that its
environmental and human health impacts are acceptable”.59 The virtue of tiered
frameworks is that they allow for extending assessment to further ecological safety
analysis encompassing more complex scenarios where “[h]igher tiers integrate processes
and characteristics occurring in natural ecosystems, such as multi-species semi-field test
systems in the EU, as well as reduction of exposure through mitigation measures in risk
management”.60 These aggregating assessments can usefully be fed back into reassessing
52 MG Vijver et al, “Postregistration Monitoring of Pesticides Is Urgently Required to Protect Ecosystems” (2017)
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry Wiley Online Library <https://setac.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.
1002/etc.3721> (last accessed 13 March 2020).
53 RB Schäfer et al, “Future Pesticide Risk Assessment: Narrowing the Gap between Intention and Reality” (2019) 31
Environmental Sciences Europe 21.
54 ibid.
55 Muilerman, supra, note 17, 49.
56 ibid.
57 Schäfer, supra, note 31.
58 Schäfer et al, supra, note 53.
59 ibid.
60 ibid.
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risk at more core levels. Such analyses provide for water issues and ensuing biodiversity
harms becoming more legible and weighty in risk assessments than they otherwise might.
Schäffer et al point out that the issue with this framework is that by default
“authorization is given as long as the predicted exposure concentration (PEC) does
not exceed the predicted no-effect concentration identified by single tiers, multiplied
by the respective safety factor. Only substances that fail all tiers are not authorized”.61
The most likely result of the safety threshold system is a no-effect judgment, because
the regulatory edifice is built on laboratory toxicity testing and the format of tiered
studies with little initial input from field studies. Such systematic underestimations (or
type II biases) can lead to “inaccurate predictions of both exposure and effects in
tiered system”.62 This critique by ecotoxicologists of the existing risk assessment
framework is shared by other scientists critical of glyphosate’s ecological harms.63
Likewise, the German Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA)
criticises tiered risk assessment as often counterproductive for ecosystems, unnecessarily
expensive and too difficult to communicate to the public.64 The recent Leopoldina report
entitled “The Silent Spring” also delineates problematic details of the tiered risk
assessment as practised today, such as deliberately not double-checking pesticide effects
that have been vetted at other levels.65 The very few experts on these issues are in
consensus: “[C]ritical revisions of related pesticide regulations and effective mitigation
measures are urgently needed to substantially reduce the environmental risks arising from
agricultural insecticide use”.66
In recent months, the pan-European politicisation of glyphosate as a problematic
chemical has brought the entire risk assessment framework under serious scrutiny.67
Nonetheless, possibly because there are only a handful of people who understand the
intricacies of the issues at hand, or due to a lack of political interest groups
advocating for the rights of aquatic ecosystems, the specific issue of harm to aquatic
ecosystems as a result of omissions in the risk assessment framework has not been made.
Defenders of the status quo risk assessment procedures note that regulatory tools,
especially the guidance recommendations used by EFSA, undergo continuous
development, and already include indirect effects (albeit in the limited sense
described above). New test and reference organisms can be specified and extended,
and as climate conditions continue to change, updates to the pre-existing models can
occur. Similarly, different models to calculate PECs are being constructed, with much
effort being spent to coordinate such approaches across scientific and regulatory
institutions. Even with these updates and addenda, however, the tiered framework
61 ibid.
62 ibid.
63 Robinson et al, supra, note 11.
64 T Frische et al, 5-Punkte-Programm für einen nachhaltigen Pflanzenschutz (Dessau-Roßlau, Umweltbundesamt
2016) <https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/publikationen/5-punkte-programm-fuer-einen-nachhaltigen-0> (last
accessed 4 June 2020).
65 Schäffer et al, supra, note 40, 18.
66 Stehle and Schulz, supra, note 18.
67 G Bazzan and M Migliorati, “Expertise, Politics and Public Opinion at the Crossroads of the European
Commission’s Decision-Making: The Case of Glyphosate” (2020) 2 International Review of Public Policy <http://
journals.openedition.org/irpp/849> (last accessed 18 May 2020).
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does not consider aggregate pressure, and it uses laboratory tests as approximations of
real-world effects. For these reasons, the tiering system prevents ecosystem effects from
being material in decision-making by isolating pertinent cross-effect observations
through unnecessarily complex regulatory stringencies that are inscrutable to most
involved parties. Glyphosate in its pure form (which occurs only in the laboratory) is
paradoxically then assessed as low toxicity and perfectly “adapted” for regulatory
systems unwilling or unable to capture real-world indirect effects – especially in
aquatic systems.
III. MUCH MORE THAN GLYPHOSATE (OR HOW RISK ASSESSMENT MARGINALISES
THE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK)
Bernhard Url, EFSA’s executive director, responded in a recent interview with news
media Euractiv that he views the conflation of science and politics in the glyphosate
saga as “unreasonable”:
Glyphosate has become the symbol of much more: it’s no longer about a herbicide,
but about the waywe do agriculture in Europe, the loss of insects and pollinators, the
globalisation of trade, biodiversity : : :
This can only be dealt with proper communication but also with a reasonable
distinction between what is policy and what is science. To give you an example,
people were surprised when they found glyphosate in the urine of their children.
But this is a policy question: if we use glyphosate, we will find it, because
analytical methods are so sensitive nowadays that basically everything can be found.
If you don’t want to find traces of glyphosate in beer or in spaghetti, then you have to
talk about its use and not about its safety. All the traces have been found present no
safety concerns and all other regulators in the world have said it is safe if it is used
properly. But it does not mean that it has to be used.
What I hope for the next glyphosate reauthorisation is that there’s also an assessment
on what would it mean, if glyphosate or herbicides are not used anymore for
biodiversity, water, farmers income, food prices, availability of foods and so on.
This was what we missed in the previous glyphosate discussion.68
Url is correct in assessing that glyphosate has ballooned into a banner representing a host
of structural issues. Arguably, the glyphosate case is not just a symbol of “much more”,
but an epiphenomenon of “much more”; it reflects that current risk regulation
compartmentalises risk diagnoses in such a way that critical questions are eluded or
“back-staged”.69 In fact, glyphosate is always excessive in its significance; there is no
68 G Fortuna, “EFSA Boss: Next Time We Should Also Assess Consequences without Glyphosate” (www.euractiv.
com, 21 May 2019) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/interview/efsa-boss-next-time-we-should-
also-assess-consequences-without-glyphosate/> (last accessed 13 March 2020). Emphasis added.
69 A Arcuri, “Glyphosate” in J Hohmann and D Joyce (eds), International Law’s Objects (Oxford, Oxford University
Press 2018) pp 234-46; see pp 242–43.
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such a thing as raw glyphosate in its actual use. Glyphosate as actually applied in any of
its over 700 commercial formulations used in the physical environment is blendedwith an
array of compounds (such as adjuvants and co-formulants) and typically receives little
scrutiny by domestic regulators, as mentioned above.70 The chemical imaginary of
glyphosate as a pure product, divorced from its adjuvants and co-formulants, does not
exist, and, as has been argued, should not be treated as if it did for regulatory
purposes. Yet, risk assessments code current law to individually assessed chemicals
without assessing them in the light of real-world chemistry, in which they are blended
together. Treating chemicals separately from a regulatory perspective, instead of
informing regulation by the science of chemistry and chemical interactions, is an
expedient legal artifice. At this point, it is worth recalling that the European legal
framework establishes a two-track system for the approval of pesticides: the active
substance, in this case glyphosate, is assessed and approved at the EU level, whereas
the different formulations are approved at the level of individual Member States and
further circulated in the internal markets through mutual recognition.71
The EU Parliament, in its 2018 Report on the Union’s authorisation procedure for
pesticides, has noted the difficulties of approval procedures at the national level as
follows: “ : : : understaffing and/or underfunding may result in over-reliance on the
assessment conducted for the approval of the active substances in the context of
decisions for plant protection products”.72 Assessing the numerous pesticide products
containing glyphosate with the same degree of granularity as for active substances
(~700 commercial formulations versus a single active substance) could in fact prove
to be a daunting task and disrupt industrial agriculture. In this context, scholars have
criticised the fact that “[p]esticide co-formulants considered to be inert are generally
exempt from the requirement for establishing a tolerance limit, and for this reason,
end-use commercial pesticide formulations escape from being subjected to chronic
toxicity testing, despite the fact that the vast majority that have been tested are
actually more toxic than the declared active ingredients alone”.73
In this respect, it warrants note that in the process for the 2017 re-authorisation of
glyphosate, the EU Commission took the unprecedented decision to propose a ban on
one of the main co-formulants used in glyphosate-based pesticides: POEA. Yet,
POEA continues to be used in other pesticides (without glyphosate) and can be
bought in the market “as a separate adjuvant mixture (product name Regain,
70 K Nagy et al, “Systematic Review of Comparative Studies Assessing the Toxicity of Pesticide Active Ingredients
and Their Product Formulations” (2020) 181 Environmental Research 108926; J Niedobová et al, “Synergistic Effects of
Glyphosate Formulation Herbicide and Tank-Mixing Adjuvants on Pardosa Spiders” (2019) 249 Environmental
Pollution 338.
71 See Art 41 Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009
concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and
91/414 (OJ 2009 L 309, p 1).
72 European Parliament, Report on the Union’s authorisation procedure for pesticides (2018/2153(INI)), A8-0475/
2018, 18.12.2018., at BW, p 14.
73 R Mesnage et al “Insight into the confusion over surfactant co-formulants in glyphosate-based herbicides” (2019)
128 Food and Chemical Toxicology 137, 138. See also R Mesnage et al, “Potential toxic effects of glyphosate and its
commercial formulations below regulatory limits” (2015) 84 Food and Chemical Toxicology 133.
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authorization 9300433) to mix with a glyphosate formulation in the spray tank”.74 The
fact that a specific co-formulant found to be dangerous at the EU level continues to be
used in non-glyphosate-based pesticides is further evidence of how formulations
containing toxic “ingredients” could more easily go undetected at the domestic level.
Against this background, one can agree with Dr Url in emphasising the importance of
distinguishing “what is policy and what is science”. The choice to assess only the active
substance (glyphosate) at the EU level cannot be separated from political choices. More
generally, risk assessment is a practice that is deeply embedded in law. As one participant
to an EFSA Management Board meeting said: “[I]t should be emphasized also that it is
legally-binding evidence-based risk assessment [that EFSA is following] : : : that EFSA,
by its mandate, will not take into consideration all available information for legal
reasons”.75 The difficulty with agencies such as EFSA making risk assessments on
chemicals such as glyphosate is that often such assessments become interpreted by
the general public, as well as scientists, as scientific findings or official consensus
rather than as hybrid practices rooted in science as well as in policy processes.76
The decision to structure risk assessment around the identification andmeasurement of
certain risks by a single isolated substance is another notable political choice. The main
health lens applied so far, for example, has been on carcinogenic risk. This is arguably
because the EU Regulation establishes that carcinogenicity is a cut-off criterion to decide
when a substance should be banned.77 Much less attention is paid, however, to
environmental risks, and by extension the downstream environmental health threats,
despite this regulation equally protecting the environment.78 The case of water is a
representative example. A report by the NGO Pesticide Action Network alleges
several instances of weakened protective standards throughout the EU regulatory
framework through controversial risk assessment methodologies, highlighting specifically
the treatment of potentially harmful metabolites in ground water as “non-relevant”.79
Generally, it is the description of data requirements in the sections on ecotoxicology and
environmental fate and behaviour that is determinative.
When the risk to aquatic environments is considered, the EFSA report lacks clarity.
The report’s conclusions mention that “[g]lyphosate and AMPA have been detected
in Europe above the parametric limit of 0.1 μg/L in a number of instances. Detailed
groundwater monitoring studies demonstrating that glyphosate exceeded the limit of
0.1 μg/L were available from Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, France and
74 See Pest Committee Meeting of 28 June 2018 EU Authorisation Procedure for Pesticides – Authorisation of Plant
Protection Products by Member States. Preparatory Questions, Answers Given by Mr Robin Mesnage, at p 4.
75 EFSA, 67thManagement BoardMeeting 3December 2015, Discussion EFSA progress report, available at<http://
www.efsa.europa.eu/en/events/event/151203#playaudio> (last accessed 28 June 2020) at ~51 minutes (emphasis
added).
76 S Hartley, “Policy Masquerading as Science: An Examination of Non-State Actor Involvement in European Risk
Assessment Policy for Genetically Modified Animals” (2016) 23 Journal of European Public Policy 276; Demortain,
supra, note 12; Jasanoff, “Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA”, supra, note 10; Funtowicz and
Ravetz, supra, note 10.
77 See Art 4 and 3.6.2 to 3.6.4 and 3.7 of Annex II, Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 71.
78 See Art 4 (2)(a) and (b), Regulation 1107/2009, supra, note 71, where it is provided that plant protection products
(a) “shall not have any harmful effects : : : on groundwater” and “(b) they shall not have any unacceptable effect on the
environment”.
79 Muilerman, supra, note 17.
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Spain”. The assessors explain that these contaminations may be due to “misuse” of the
product and that drinking water can be treated using chlorinating procedures.80 But even
if “misuse” would be the primary case of the violation of parametric limits, should such
“misuse” not be considered as part of the embodied risk?
Interestingly, in different contexts, other EU legal representatives consider the use or
misuse of potentially toxic products as part of risk and hence of “risk assessment”. This
has been an issue in the Hormones dispute between the EU and the USA. The World
Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body has concluded that “abuse” or “misuse”
of potentially toxic products can be considered as part of risk assessment.81 In this
context, the EU has tried to defend its precautionary policies (eg vis-à-vis the use of
hormones in food chains for growth-promotion purposes), which, to be fully realised,
may need a more holistic conceptualisation of risk assessment. It could be argued that
by considering real harms as products of misuse rather than design or inaccurate
modelling, both companies and regulatory agencies, across industries, effectively
externalise actual risk.82
As mentioned above, another major limit to the type of risk assessment used for
regulatory purposes is that it does not examine chemical mixtures and their synergistic
(dysergistic) impacts.83 Yet, the aquatic environment is exposed to these mixtures
together rather than single substances sequentially. Risk assessment practices also fail to
retrospectively look at the data produced through environmental monitoring that
examines the manifold ways through which chemicals are transformed by the substrate
through which they travel and react.84 In this respect, the European Court of Auditors has
issued a Special Report that criticises – among others – the deficient status of the
environmental monitoring of pesticides.85
To fully understand how environmental risk is further side-lined in contemporary
practices of risk assessment, we need to take a step back and look at how pesticides
80 See European Food Safety Authority, “Conclusion on the Peer Review of the Pesticide Risk Assessment of the
Active Substance Glyphosate” (2015) 13 EFSA Journal 4302; Muilerman, supra, note 17, 17.
81 The question of whether abuse ofmisuse of potentially toxic substances should be part of a risk assessment has been
addressed by the WTO Court, when considering the risks of hormones used for growth promotion. In that context, the
Appellate Body found that “the abuse or misuse in the administration of oestradiol-17β has a bearing on the particular
risks being assessed by the European Communities”. See Appellate Body Report,United States –Continued Suspension
of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R, adopted 14 November 2008 (US – Continued
Suspension).
82 L Dorfman et al, “Soda and Tobacco Industry Corporate Social Responsibility Campaigns: How Do They
Compare?” (2012) 9 PLoS Medicine e1001241; J Elias, YH Hendlin and PM Ling, “Public versus Internal
Conceptions of Addiction: An Analysis of Internal Philip Morris Documents” (2018) 15 PLoS Medicine e1002562;
H Vainio, “Public Health and Evidence-Informed Policy-Making: The Case of a Commonly Used Herbicide”
(2020) 46 Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment & Health 105; PA McDaniel, EA Lown and RE Malone,
““It Doesn’t Seem to Make Sense for a Company That Sells Cigarettes to Help Smokers Stop Using Them”: A
Case Study of Philip Morris’s Involvement in Smoking Cessation” (2017) 12 PLoS ONE e0183961; EA Smith and
TE Novotny, “Whose Butt Is It? Tobacco Industry Research about Smokers and Cigarette Butt Waste” (2011)
20(Suppl. 1) Tobacco Control i2.
83 European Commission and Directorate General for Health & Consumers, Toxicity and Assessment of Chemical
Mixtures (Brussels, European Commission 2012).
84 European Commission and Directorate General for Health & Consumers, Addressing the New Challenges for Risk
Assessment (Brussels, European Commission 2013) <http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=eub:notice:ndaz13002:en:
html> (last accessed 11 March 2020).
85 European Court of Auditors, “Sustainable use of plant protection products: limited progress in measuring and
reducing risks”, Special Report 5 February 2020, paras 44–52.
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are regulated in Europe through Regulation 1107/2009 concerning the placing of PPPs on
the market and Directive 2009/128/EC on the sustainable use of pesticides.86 The
European legal framework can be seen as a dual system. As briefly mentioned above,
on the one hand, active substances (such as glyphosate) are to be assessed and
approved by EU institutions; on the other hand, the commercial products to be placed
on the market (including co-formulants) are approved by national authorities and can
further circulate in Europe by virtue of mutual recognition. Next to the authorisation
process, this dual system is reproduced in how issues of sustainability are addressed.
In this context, Directive 2009/128, which has the general goal of achieving “a
sustainable use of pesticides by reducing the risks and impacts [not necessarily the
amount] of pesticide [like glyphosate] use on human health and the environment and
promoting the use of integrated pest management and of alternative approaches or
techniques such as non-chemical alternatives to pesticides” (see Article 1, Directive
2009/128), establishes only few specific obligations on Member States (eg prohibition
of aerial spraying, per Article 9). For the rest, it delegates to the Member States the
enactment of specific measures through the adoption of National Action Plans
(NAPs; see Article 4, Directive 2009/128). As a result, the question of whether the
use of pesticides like RoundUp® is reduced and/or used more sustainably depends on
the measures adopted by individual Member States. In this context, it is worth
mentioning that reduction targets are absent from virtually all NAPs (the main
exception being France).87
NAPs have been widely criticised by environmental groups. Looking at the Directive
itself, it becomes clear that, at the heart of the EUDirective, a vague political compromise
ends up eliding concrete policy objectives: the Directive leaves slack in interpreting
whether the absolute quantities of pesticides should be reduced, or “merely” the
associated risk of pesticide use: “ : : : risk reduction or use targets shall be set at times
and targets for the restriction of use, in particular where the restriction of use is an
appropriate instrument to achieve risk reduction in relation to the priority topics
referred to in Article 15(2)(c)”. According to EU law, NAPs require stakeholder
participation and, in principle, the possibility to publicly scrutinise pesticide-related
plans. The inadequacy of these plans has been nowhere as clear as in Germany,
where, in 2011, stakeholders that aligned with environmental interests left the NAP in
protest (surprisingly, this included the commercial German association of energy and
water industries, BDEW). NGOs report that a lack of transparency and a dubious
selection of indicators were the reasons for their withdrawal from the NAP, noting
that the ministry-led process would – in the end – strengthen the current system of
agricultural use of chemical PPPs rather than reduce dependency on agrochemicals.88
86 See Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009, supra, note 71, and Report from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council on Member State National Action Plans and on progress in the implementation of Directive 2009/128/
EC on the sustainable use of pesticides 10.10.2017 COM(2017) 587 final, at 1.
87 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, supra, note 86, 5.
88 For a detailed statement of German environmental NGOs like PAN, NABU, BUND and Greenpeace, see<http://
www.pan-germany.org/download/Umweltverbaende_Stellungnahme_zum%20_NAP_Entwurf_vom_270912.pdf>
(last accessed 1 June 2020).
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In this way, the NAPs demonstrate power imbalances in participatory processes of
environmental entrenched interests that contradict those of protectors of aquatic
ecosystem health, and instead do not address issues such as the excessive use of
glyphosate. In this context, PAN criticises the Dutch NAP as an example of private
actors drawing up guidelines for agricultural application without broad stakeholder
participation.89 The binding nature of the NAPs varies from country to country, but is
extremely weak overall. In Denmark, for example, the ban of chemical pesticides in
certain areas for urban drinking water falls into abstraction due to the lack of
concretisation in determining an “overall pesticide load indicator”. In addition to
countless unambitious declarations of intent, as in Germany or Poland, there are also
processes of silent adoption of binding targets, as in the Netherlands in terms of plant
protection plans, where plant protection monitors have been suddenly introduced.
In Germany, the coalition government announced a national insect protection
programme that calls for the reduction of pesticides, especially glyphosate, with a
specific stipulation of phasing out the herbicide completely by 2023.90 Polls in
Germany suggested that more than seven out of ten people favour a ban on the
substance,91 which was cited to be a factor in the agreement of both agricultural and
environmental ministries to this phase-out.92 But Germany’s responsible agency BVL
authorised its use until 15 December 2020 for another year, without any changes to
application rules, or even regulation of private usage, or any type of minimisation/
reduction strategy.93 And the Glyphosate Renewal Group – a group of agrochemical
producers – has already submitted applications for renewal of the substance after
2023.94 The battle around glyphosate was the catalyst for the inception of the PEST
Committee of the European Parliament in 2018.95
Regrettably, beyond the obligation of developing NAPs, the question of howMember
States can and should assess the risks of pesticides remains elusive. As mentioned above,
89 PAN Europe, “Monitoring EU SUD Compliance: PAN’s Suggestions for Better Future Auditing and
Implementation” (2018) <https://www.pan-europe.info/resources/briefings/2018/10/monitoring-eu-sud-compliance-
pan%E2%80%99s-suggestions-better-future-auditing> (last accessed 13 March 2020).
90 “Deutschland will Glyphosat bis Ende 2023 verbieten” (DER STANDARD) <https://www.derstandard.de/story/
2000108231583/deutschland-will-glyphosat-bis-ende-2023-verbieten> (last accessed 14March 2020); J Salz, “Warum
Glyphosat, wenn auch heißes Wasser hilft?” (www.euractiv.de, 1 October 2019) <https://www.euractiv.de/section/
landwirtschaft-und-ernahrung/news/warum-glyphosat-wenn-auch-heisses-wasser-hilft/> (last accessed 14
March 2020).
91 A Neslen, “Two-Thirds of Europeans Support Ban on Glyphosate – Poll” (The Guardian, 11 April 2016)<https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/11/two-thirds-of-europeans-support-ban-on-glyphosate-says-yougov-
poll> (last accessed 14 March 2020); INSA-Consulere GmbH, “Online Poll in Germany, France, Italy, Greece and
Portugal” (2017) EU Glyphosate Poll <https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.sumofus.org/images/Summary_results_glyphosate_
INSA_Oct_2017.pdf> (last accessed 14 March 2020).
92 F Poetschke, “Minister Schulze Presents Plan for Glyphosate Phase-Out” (Umweltbundesamt, 9 November 2018)
<https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/press/pressinformation/minister-schulze-presents-plan-for-glyphosate-phase>
(last accessed 14 March 2020).
93 Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit, “BVL – Fachmeldungen – Beschluss Des OVG
Lüneburg: Rechtsmittel Gegen Verkürztes Zulassungsende Haben Aufschiebende Wirkung” (10 January 2020)
<https://www.bvl.bund.de/SharedDocs/Fachmeldungen/04_pflanzenschutzmittel/2020/
2020_01_23_Fa_Rechtsmittel_verkuerztes_Zulassungsende.html> (last accessed 14 March 2020).
94 “Glyphosate Renewal Group” (2020) <https://glyphosate.eu/> (last accessed 14 March 2020).
95 B Chatain, “Pesticides: Parliament to Set up Special Committee | News | European Parliament” (18 January 2018)
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180118IPR92014/pesticides-parliament-to-set-up-special-
committee> (last accessed 14 March 2020).
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the Directive itself remains ambiguous as to the necessity (if not the urgency) of addressing
the absolute quantities of pesticides discharged in the environment. In the Anthropocene,
quantity is crucial to safety. But in a market-driven society, decreasing the quantity of
agricultural inputs results in a net loss of income for the supplying manufactures. In this
sense, it is remarkable how the regulatory framework marginalises questions of quantity.
The fact that glyphosate is the most widely used active substance in pesticides worldwide
is masterfully eclipsed by elusive NAPs. The words of Dr Url, which dissociate safety
from use, may then reflect the resistance of a regulatory system that tends to privilege
the protection of capital over the protection of the environment. At the very least,
methodological assumptions baked into the system bias risk assessments towards the
assumption of non-toxicity for all of the configurations of toxicity that are not known.
The case of water is exemplary in displaying how this disassociation seems to underpin
the current EU legal framework, which marginalises sound appraisal and management
of environmental risks. On the one hand, the legal framework recognises the
importance of water; for example, Paragraph 15 of the Preamble of Directive 2009/128
explicitly refers to the fact that the “aquatic environment is especially sensitive to
pesticides”, and that “[i]t is : : : necessary for particular attention to be paid to
avoiding pollution of surface water and groundwater by taking appropriate measures,
such as the establishment of buffer and safeguard zones or planting hedges along surface
waters to reduce exposure of waterbodies to spray drift, drain flow and run-off”.
Moreover, according to Article 11, Member States shall establish specific measures to
protect the aquatic environment and drinking water. On the other hand, the legal
framework fails to establish the institutions to systematically collect information and
monitor the effects of pesticides on aquatic environments and to protect the aquatic
environment in effective ways.96 Numerous reasons contribute to the undercutting of
these principles, and critical NGOs admonish that crucial information is overlooked,
hidden in guidance documents or circumvented through undetected non-compliance
with such documents, with a further issue being the political process surrounding the
nomination of experts to relevant committees.97
In short, the legal architecture bywhichmost attention is directed towards assessing the
carcinogenic risk of the active substance diverts attention away from other important risks
deserving of consideration, such as the risk to surfacewater and groundwater. Despite the
acknowledgment in the legal text that the (aquatic) environment should be protected (eg
Article 4 Regulation 1107/2009 and Paragraph 15 of the Preamble of Directive 2009/128),
the legal framework lacks strong andwell-coordinated provisions to address this issue. This
is not only evidenced by the weak NAPs of individual Member States, but also by the
proven pollution of watercourses by glyphosate and the absence of (planned) corrective
measures.98 Regrettably, the concrete rules relating to the protection of surface and
ground waters remain aspirational at best.
96 In this respect, see also the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, supra, note
86, where it states: “Member States have taken a range of measures to protect the aquatic environment from pesticide use,
but in the absence of measurable targets in most national action plans it is difficult to assess the progress achieved” at 10.
97 Muilerman, supra, note 17; Robinson et al, supra, note 11.
98 There is much evidence of contamination of water by glyphosate, as reported by EFSA. For additional evidence,
see Paris, supra, note 23.
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IV. DISCUSSION
Let us return once again to the words of Bernd Url when he writes: “What I hope for the
next glyphosate reauthorisation is that there’s also an assessment on what would it mean,
if glyphosate or herbicides are not used anymore for biodiversity, water, farmers [sic]
income, food prices, availability of foods and so on”.99 This statement invites
consideration of broader questions; yet, it conflates a number of key socio-political
and scientific questions and, above all, implicitly forecloses the discussion of a
plurality of scenarios. First, the statement suggests that the only choice we have is
glyphosate/herbicide versus a fully pesticide-free world with the assumed knock-on
hardships that would ensure. But, what about a significant reduction of the use of
pesticides, or the adoption of biocompatible agrichemicals? Harm reduction in
pesticide use is sometimes hyperbolically taken as an extreme abolitionism, rather
than an admission that there is both a problem of chemical overuse in food
production (with the documented consequences) and that realistic steps can be taken
now to reduce the harms. The current legal system, with its split between a single-
substance authorisation system and weak NAPs, seems oblivious to the total amount
of pesticides used. Given the above analysis regarding the negative effects of
glyphosate (and pesticides more generally) on the environment, it is striking that
legally so little is done to reduce the total quantities of pesticides used in agriculture.
It seems as if prevailing regulation has proved too blunt an instrument to deal with
the incremental reductions necessary that would effect immediate improvement in
health, ecological effects and ground water, without substantially upsetting prevailing
high-input agricultural practices. Indeed, this gap in the regulatory system may also
be seen as halting innovation and providing perverse incentives to firms. This
structural gap has also been identified as a weakness of the EU legal framework by
the recent report of the European Court of Auditors and as a major obstacle for
“reducing the risks of PPP use”.100 One hopes that the new resolve by the EU to
adopt pesticide reduction targets, matured within the context of the New Green Deal,
will be followed by concrete and resolute action.101
Second, viewing the legal system as a site of knowledge production permits enquiring
into the focus on risk assessment and the serious limits of such assessments as currently
practiced for the authorisation of active substances regarding what knowledge is
considered relevant in the regulatory process. Crucially, by focusing on the carcinogenic
risk of the isolated substances to the exclusion of other demarcating lines or factors,
knowledge on the effects of real-world chemical mixtures gets side-lined, as well
as the effects of chemical cocktails on aquatic environments and life dwelling in
affected habitats. Marginalising the effects of chemicals on non-human organism
populations is the current default, but there is no inevitability that it must have
become so, nor for it to continue. One may ask, then, whether the current configura-
tion of risk assessment practices constitutes a particular manifestation of a “hegemonic
99 Fortuna, supra, note 68.
100 See supra, note 77.
101 ES Nicolás, “EU wants to halve use of pesticides by 2030” (EU Observer, 20 May 2020) <https://euobserver.
com/green-deal/148434> (last accessed 28 June 2020).
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principle of selectivity”.102 When we engage uncritically with the question Url poses,
we risk being oblivious of key scientific insights as well as socio-political questions.
Url’s statement may also eclipse another larger question: is the current risk assessment
preventing us from engaging in an open and much-needed conversation around which
types of agricultural practices are desirable for the Anthropocene era?103
Political, sociocultural and most of all economic entrenchment of agrochemicals make
it very hard to regulate against them. Once introduced for crop protection as modern and
effective, other methods become negatively valanced as primitive or archaic, even when
they are also (or even more) effective (with potentially fewer side effects). The status quo
bias in favour of supporting existing chemical use requires re-examining the entire
infrastructure that led to such defaults, including the path dependency of approving
given chemicals such as glyphosate.
Rather than ignoring or avoiding confrontation with the messy business of risk
regulation by assessing the “easiest” and most “contained” models, making
interdisciplinary sense of the sheer number of interactions and impacts chemical
mixtures have as they react with their chemical and biological environments of
application should be the actual matter of concern for risk regulation, however
challenging it may be in practice.
Part of the weakness of social and political power in determining top-down whether
or not a given population chooses the risks of such exposures emerges from the “divide
and conquer” public relations of chemical manufacturers.104 In many instances of
agrochemical risk regulation and its framing by agrochemical companies, farmers and
consumers are pitted against each other, when in fact farmers are normally much
more exposed than those who eventually consume their products.105 Paradoxically,
farmers lobbying against their own health interests and for the status quo of the
extensive inputs they depend on from agrochemical manufacturers means that
entrenchment of harmful pesticides is often enacted by frontline proxies like farmers,
who are most likely to suffer the health consequences. The reasons for farmers
viewing pesticide regulations as threats to their successful harvests, rather than aiming
at protecting their health and offering them effective alternatives,106 is a complex and
102 The term “hegemonic principle of selectivity” has been used by RWolff, “Efficiency: Whose Efficiency” (2002)
16(3) Post-Autistic Economics Review 1. Discussing the concept of efficiency in economic analysis, the author writes,
“Usually, one principle of selectivity reigns hegemonic: one set of selected effects is deemed ‘important’ and worth
counting while others are marginalized or ignored altogether”.
103 It should be noted that both the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food and the UN Special Rapporteur on the
implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and
wastes, in noting the adverse impact of pesticides on human rights, agree that it is necessary to address the
questions of sustainable agricultural practices. In their 2017 Report, they write: “It is time to overturn the myth that
pesticides are necessary to feed the world and create a global process to transition toward safer and healthier food
and agricultural production”. See Press release, “Pesticides are ‘global human rights concern’, say UN experts
urging new treaty” <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21306> (last
accessed 28 June 2020).
104 Wagner, supra, note 46.
105 JP Myers et al, “Concerns over Use of Glyphosate-Based Herbicides and Risks Associated with Exposures: A
Consensus Statement” (2016) 15 Environmental Health 19.
106 C Badgley et al, “Organic Agriculture and the Global Food Supply” (2007) 22 Renewable Agriculture and Food
Systems 86.
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motivated history107 that is beyond the scope of this paper. It is evident, nonetheless, that
taking seriously the intersectional issues of soil fertility, waterway health and human
well-being requires a wholesale restructuring of the rules of agriculture to prevent an
artificially input-driven race to the bottom.108
There is also no reason to ignore important known information regarding the effects of
chemicals on any sort of organism population or life system. The intricacies of the
scientific findings on these topics call for creating enough regulatory space to assess
and assimilate new data as they become known and to update regulation in more or
less real time to encompass and encourage data that might require rearranging risk
assessments and their accompanying policies. Wagner has suggested that one way to
address the “toxics data gap” is to force chemical manufacturers to compete against
each other in terms of risk reporting requirements, which would in turn “reposition”
the role of regulatory agencies to harness the “expertise, information, and energies of
manufacturers of safer products eager to put their competitors’ more hazardous
products out of business” to benefit those companies that would gain through
marketing safer products.109 A similar approach has been instituted in the United
Nations Global Compact (UNGC), which rewards companies with social license for
their environmental and social reporting transparency. This voluntary mechanism
creates the positive externality of data baselines for industries, even when only a few
rival manufacturers choose to be transparent, as those participating companies set the
bar for the rest of the industry. While the UNGC is not without its problems, this
facet at least seems to answer Wagner’s call for creating a “market competition
between rival firms to produce relevant information about the toxicity of certain
chemical products on the market”.110
True, reconfiguring risk regulation to take into account the full spectrum of
environmental and human health harms will likely substantially reprioritise certain
low-externality farming methods over the known harms of industrial agriculture.
However, such disruptive regulation can also provide new economic niches for
techniques and environmentally integrated companies working in regenerative
agriculture.111 More publicly and environmentally orientated risk regulations do not
condemn the economics of farming, but perhaps change the players. Ecologies of
innovation stipulate that companies and social creativity do not occur in isolation, but
rather in ecosystems with other stimulating and constraining factors that uniquely
establish niches to develop new technologies or services – which always interface
107 D Fagin and M Lavelle, Toxic Deception: How the Chemical Industry Manipulates Science, Bends the Law and
Endangers Your Health (Monroe, ME, Common Courage Press 2002); M Nestle and M Pollan, Food Politics: How the
Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health (Rev Exp edition, Berkeley, University of California Press 2013).
108 UNCTAD, “Wake Up Before It Is Too Late. Make Agriculture Truly Sustainable Now for Food Security and
Changing Climate” (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2013).
109 Wagner, supra, note 46, 631.
110 idem.
111 E Toensmeier, The Carbon Farming Solution: A Global Toolkit of Perennial Crops and Regenerative Agriculture
Practices for Climate Change Mitigation and Food Security (Hartford, VT, Chelsea Green Publishing 2016); S
Sherwood and N Uphoff, “Soil Health: Research, Practice and Policy for a More Regenerative Agriculture” (2000)
15 Applied Soil Ecology 85; CE LaCanne and JG Lundgren, “Regenerative Agriculture: Merging Farming and
Natural Resource Conservation Profitably” (2018) 6 PeerJ e4428.
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with and are enabled by the state, whether consciously or not.112 Disruptive regulation for
the public’s benefit can restore commons, help farmers move away from soil-depleting
agricultural practices fed by monopolised commodity chains, offer consumers more
choice and empower ecologically focused companies previously at a disadvantage
under previous chemical regimes.
Without a firm commitment to reducing overall pesticide use, however, such policies
can be complicated by the tensions that regulatory agencies face due to not wanting to ban
chemicals such as glyphosate because such a vacuum might result in new replacement
chemicals that are even more dangerous than existing ones. An example of this, premised
on the inevitability of harmful synthetic chemicals as a part of everyday life, is the film
The Devil We Know, which takes its name from DuPont’s fifty-year cover-up of the fact
that the group of chemicals (per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances classified as “C8”) that
make Teflon® and other perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorinated alkylated
substance (PFA) products cause birth defects, based on previously secret DuPont and
3M documents.113 Although DuPont was aware of this fact decades before independent
researchers finally indicted these chemicals,114 DuPont management resisted replacing it,
claiming “C8 is the devil we know”, whereas a new chemical (“the devil we don’t
know”) might even be more dangerous.115 Certainly, this argument has been made
strenuously against banning glyphosate.116 But such perhaps deserved fears that if we
dispose of current risky chemicals then their replacements could present even greater
risks is not only held by chemical manufactures, but also by regulatory bodies. Of
course, such logic is premised on the inevitability of continued levels of chemical inputs,
rather than scrutinising sceptically the perceived need for their continuance, especially
according to business as usual.
Government agencies and regulators, however, do often fall into such frames of
inevitability, buying into the actuality rather than the construction of dilemmas of
regulating dangerous substances. Such framing is likely influenced by industry and
the well-trodden revolving door between government regulation agencies, which are
frequently accused of pro-industry thinking at the disservice of environmental
protection.117 Regulators’ perceptions, however unfounded, often collapse into a sense
of being trapped, backed into a corner, where they cannot take decisive precautionary
action, as if the arrangement of profits and shareholders for corporations, together with
industry capture of regulatory agencies, precludes them from autonomous action going
against the grain. While such outlooks are understandable, we need to move our
112 M Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths (London, Penguin Books
2018).
113 S Soechtig and J Seifert, The Devil We Know (Los Angeles, CA, Atlas Films 2019)<http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt7689910/> (last accessed 16 December 2019).
114 G Arenson, “Toxicity of Teflon Dispersing Agents” (Industry Documents Library, 9 November 1961) <https://
www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/#id=snpw0228> (last accessed 14 March 2020).
115 A Playtis, “Toxicity Information – C8” (Chemical Industry Documents, 26 October 1991) <https://www.
industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/docs/#id=fppw0228> (last accessed 14 March 2020).
116 Duke and Powles, supra, note 42.
117 Muilerman, supra, note 17; Allen, supra, note 22; D Pellow, Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements
for Environmental Justice (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press 2007); Fagin and Lavelle, supra, note 107; Nestle and Pollan,
supra, note 107; N Freudenberg, Lethal but Legal: Corporations, Consumption, and Protecting Public Health
(1st edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2014).
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regulatory institutions out of the realm of resigned determinism and animate them to define
themselves as agencies creating coherent policies protecting the public interest. Right now,
only a very thin veneer separates regulatory agencies from industry,118 without meaningful
circuit breakers that alert if a problem occurs. The cooperative model of industry with
government has its limits, and at least some agencies need to be adversarial to industry,
as Wagner suggests. For any system to achieve resilience, redundancy, slack and
flexibility are required.119 We need this in our institutions as well, with multiple back-ups
in case one agency fails, using precaution and updating policies according to new
findings from the field.
Finally, the asymmetry between the economic priorities for chemical manufacturers
and farmers bound up in high-input agriculture overshadowing other concerns
continues to haunt rational risk regulation and policymaking. Property rights as they
have been distributed are framed as sacrosanct, while human rights and biodiversity
rights, or rights against ecocide, are framed as aspirational, not yet configured into the
balance in cost–benefit analyses. The long-term impact of such short-term thinking
requires coordination to rationally reassess this dilemma.
V. CONCLUSION
The interactions between pesticides and water and the theoretical, modelled or otherwise
a priori predictions reach their asymptote of explanatory power in the messy world of in
situ application. This contribution discussed less the nitty-gritty of the biodiversity
impact from a natural science perspective, and instead analysed the discourse and
regulatory means surrounding the measurement and assessment of these impacts.
Regulatory bodies have historically been simultaneously very concernedwith and very
lax regarding chemical pollution in water. We documented that while existing EU laws
could be marshalled for strong protection of aquatic environments – even when
thresholds are surpassed – little is done to either post facto make amends or
preventatively take measures to ensure that such limits will not be breached in the future.
Risk assessment will play a crucial role in the 2022 EFSA decision to deny or renew the
continued use of glyphosate in the EU. Especially in light of the – in our opinion – overly
dominant focus on whether the chemical is carcinogenic,120 we have sought to show the
necessity to expand such decisions in order to account for other pertinent factors, such as
admixture effects on wildlife and fresh water. Such as an expansion would align with the
target of enhancing “policy coherence for sustainable development” called for in
Sustainable Development Goal 17.4. It would be a mistake, however, to take an
118 T Clunies-Ross and N Hildyard, The Politics of Industrial Agriculture (Abingdon, Routledge 2013); JL Harrison,
“Pesticide Purveyors and Corporate Power” in S Jayaraman and K De Master (eds), Bite Back: People Taking on
Corporate Food and Winning (Berkeley, University of California Press 2020) pp 51–62.
119 G Gallopín, “Planning for Resilience: Scenarios, Surprises, and Branch Points” in LH Gunderson and CS Holling
(eds), Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems (Washington, DC, Island Press 2002)
pp 361–93.
120 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), Toxicological Profile for Glyphosate (Draft for
Public Comment, Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service 2019); L Zhang et al,
“Exposure to Glyphosate-Based Herbicides and Risk for Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma: A Meta-Analysis and
Supporting Evidence” (2019) 781 Mutation Research 186.
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“innocent until proven guilty” approach with regards to harms, especially in light of the
lack of well-established monitoring mechanisms. Because of the insurmountable lag as
science catches up with reality, overweighting “evidence-based” policy that requires
watertight evidence before limiting the default approval of known problematic
pesticides promotes a laissez-faire approach to regulating human and environmental
health and creates a smokescreen for not addressing deep-rooted agri-cultural
problems.121 At best, the glyphosate case presents the opportunity to create a
comprehensive chemical framework in the EU focused on precaution rather than
adding more ad hoc and insulated evaluations (inviting their own problems)122
incrementally tinkering with a process deserving an organised overhaul.
121 Schäfer et al, supra, note 53.
122 S Weber and H Burtscher-Schaden, “Detailed Expert Report on Plagiarism and Superordinated Copy Paste in the
Renewal Assessment Report (RAR) on Glyphosate” (2019) <https://www.greens-efa.eu/files/doc/docs/
298ff6ed5d6a686ec799e641082cdb63.pdf> (last accessed 23 September 2019).
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